Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) - Through Life Management Costs forecast to rise

In Testimony concerning the US Department of Defense 2011 Funding Authorization onFebruary 2nd, 2010, "NAVAIR recently determined that the Marine Corps and the Navy’s version of the Joint Strike Fighter may end up being too expensive to operate, with each flight hour flown costing about $31,000, compared with around $19,000 for a flight hour for the service’s current F/A-18 Hornets and AV-8B Harriers."

For the United Kingdom's recently completed Strategic Defence Review (named SDSR to differentiate it from the 1998 SDR), this data is somewhat problematic.

A decision to reduce the carrier programme and JSF buy serves logically to increase the unit costs of the aircraft and ship(s) procured. This data substantially affects the through-life costings into maintaining the fleet of JSF aircraft by the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force.

One of the SDSR decisions is to retire the Harrier aircraft which means not only will Fleet Air Arm pilots on the new carrier(s) lack familiarity with carrier flight ops though also it will be more expensive. Factor in the challenges around Carrier Strike Group re-supply and the fact that the CVF design was fitted for however not with steam catapults could have been a good example of foresight making it through the procurement system.

The aircraft carrier debate & Australia moving 500 miles Westwards: Plus-ca-change

The aircraft carrier debate & Australia moving 500 miles Westwards: Plus-ca-change
October 26, 2010

As part of my PhD research which was funded via a scholarship from funds made available by the Ministry of Defence I looked into the issues, theories and dynamics of strategic decision making applying my model and others to the latest available material from the archives of the Public Records Office.

At the time the latest materials concerned the 'Healey Reviews' of the mid 1960s which heralded a period of substantial British military and political disengagement from its 'East of Suez' commitments. One of the strongest threads running through the period was the battles between the armed services over resources and key programmes - of which the most contentious were the Royal Air Force's TSR-2 aircraft and the Royal Navy next generation aircraft carrier programme, known as CVA-01.

The CVA-01 was revolutionary, large and designed to support power projection for decades to come. The island (control tower) was offset so that aircraft could taxi around it. The displacement was substantial - and at a time of financial crisis - it was, like the TSR-2 too expensive.

Something had to go and the Royal Navy at least had a champion in terms of the first officer appointed to the new position of Chief of Defence Staff in the newly (April 1st, 1964) Ministry of Defence - Lord Mountbatten - the archtypal sailor.

To supplement the output of the archives - which includes various passionate memos to the Secretary of State from 1st Sea Lord and Chief of the Air Staff I studied the organisational directories of the time and identified two persons to interview. One was the Military Assistant to Lord Mountbatten, an aircraft carrier captain himself. The other was a junior civil servant working with the staff of CAS - whom would go on to become Permanent Under Secretary of the Department, Michael Quinlan.

At stake in the battle was the crucial issue - could aircraft (ie. TSR-2) conduct the missions using an air basing strategy of airfields around the world conduct the tasks of carrier-borne aviation ? Aircraft carriers, the air complement and logistics tail needed to support them was and remains in the current debates an expensive proposition. fields of concrete on land could prove a lot cheaper. The counter-arguments were many and of them several held great weight - which brings us to the urban legend at the heart of the mid-1960s defence reviews - that the Royal Air Force moved Australia 500 miles West to justify their strategy could obviate the requirement for investment in CVA-01 - with the consequence that the carrier programme should be cancelled in favour of investment in TSR-2.

My interviews sought to clarify this episode for research sake though also for my own curiousity. The Americans pushed strenuously for Britain to maintain forces East of Suez, even offering an aircraft carrier cheaply for the RN to use to keep them in the game - which in the archives was discounted 'due to inadequate messing [dining] arrangements'. Although my interview suggested that the configuration of arrestor wires might have been a greater factor at the operational level.

Mountbatten's MA was sprightly and still possessed strong memories of the event. He remembered clearly a presentation from CAS which looked somewhat odd to a man who has spent most of his life pouring over admiralty charts. Excusing himself from the presentation he pulled a map which showed that the type of projection being used by the RAF enabled Australia to conveniently fit into the flight peformance envelope of the TSR-2, thus justifying the strategy. The MA advised Mountbatten, pulling him out of the meeting on another pretext and the game was up.

Meeting Michael Quinlan during a visit to the Royal Military College of Science was, on reflection a great opportunity. I would like to think that I genuinely caught him off guard with him expecting me to ask a variety of questions concerning the 1990 options-for-change review, the personal dynamics of which were colourfully captured in Alan Clark's Diaries.

His view differed and a few weeks after meeting him a two page letter with a long quotation I was free to use in my research appeared. Sir Michael's view was that,

"In a genuine mistake, soon detected and rectified, an officer in the Air Staff based certain calculations about the capabilities of land-based air power on a figure some hundreds of miles too short for the distance between the Indian Ocean island of Aldabra - then under consideration for development as an air base - and a hypothetical operational area on the mainland of Africa. The episode (which later became, sometimes with embellishment. a treasured Royal Navy anecdote) was indignantly seized upon by the Naval Staff as evidence of Air Staff duplicity. This illustrates the level of feeling and tension which the review generated between the two Services".

So who was right ? Ultimately, and I might suggest that this be the real lesson, that inter-service rivalry delayed decisions being made before the resource constraints hammer really fell on the Ministry. CVA-01 was cancelled. TSR-2 was cancelled. The RAF proposed buying US F-111 swing-wing bombers - and that was cancelled too due to resources cuts and an IMF crisis.

Playing a very minor industrial role during the early stages of the CVF programme one can look back and see, post-SDSR, that delaying decision-making in a quest for the best military solution can risk ending up with a very compromised solution downstream. Years of prevarication I am sure are regretted from the corridors of the Ministry, to CINC Fleet Headquarters to industry balance sheets, ship building union offices and ultimately the communities of men and women simply trying to make a living.

The original in-service dates I remember for CVA-01 and CVA-02 were 2010 and 2012 respectively. Just to think that had the deadlines been held the SDSR would have been completed with one aircraft carrier having been recently or imminently launched by a senior member of the Royal Family with the newly elected administration in full attendance.

cest tragic. Should you wish to read in greater detail my own research into the defence policy battles of the mid 1960s I should like to point you to a copy of my PhD research at:

(Full copy of my PhD research thesis)

(A more concise version of the story published by the UK Defence Forum)

(A presentation to military students concerning TSR-2 versus CVA-01)

Technorati Tags: Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF), SDSR Review, UK Ministry of Defence

Commentary on the unveiling of UK MOD SDSR Review

Commentary on the unveiling of UK MOD SDSR Review
October 19th, 2010

Prime Minister David Cameron unveiled the outcome of the Spending Review for the Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom earlier today.

A scorecard approach to the key points covered by the BBC News website runs as follows;

* "8% cut in real terms" - Does this exclude the MoD running over budget by approximately 10% ? If not, then the cuts are approximately 20% and this exercise represents political theatre.

* "RAF and RN numbers to be reduced" - For the RAF closing bases reduces headcount and is desirable - in the end aircraft availability is the only criteria for size. For the RN it is a little more problematic (as outlined below).

* "HMS Ark Royal will be decommissioned four years early" - The issue for the RN is how will they staff properly the new carrier(s) when they finally come down the slipway ? As usual there is more 'lust' in terms of wanting the capability than there is through-life management.

* "Surface fleet cut from 24 to 19" - A graph drawn for me a few years ago during a meeting a main building showed the trend in the fall of the Fleet since the 1960s - the logical outcome was a surface fleet of 16 - you read it here first ! The key question is how do you protect the carriers and replenishment vessels - with a couple of ships (best case) in dry-dock at a time seventeen ships covering 70% of the Earth's surface is challenging.

* Astute untouched - VERY good news as they will be key for special operations, surveillance and producing effect.

* "Trident delay" - Tolerable as long as the Astute drumbeat can be synchronised to ensure minimal loss of manufacturing skills (and pressure from the supply chain to maximise profit). The reduction in warheads is interesting and suggests cutting the numbers to fit a stretched Astute SSBN design. Vanguard has 16 missile tubes, each capable of carrying 8 warheads (under the START Treaty) implying each missile has 3 warheads. 40 warheads implies 10 tubes each with four warheads and associated shrinkage of the vessel's length (plus some simplification in terms of engineering and obviously, cost). That said Personally this Editor would favour stretching Astute acquisition using nuclear tipped Tomahawk TLAM missiles.

* Closure of RAF Kinloss and Nimrod to be retired - Sad news for the Scottish community - and no doubt the lack of Conservative support was an issue. Nimrod is technologically being outpaced by the likes of the Global Hawk UAV, and time needs to move on. Political pain around the tragic loss of a Nimrod in Afghanistan likely contributed to the decision to retire.

* Harrier retirement and Tornado part retirement - RAF should shed themselves of Tornado at a faster rate than Harrier. This move smacks of a play by the Air Marshals given Harrier is a joint force. Losing Harrier substantially ahead of JSF introduction will kill the skill level of the Fleet Air Arm operating from the new CVF. Very shortsighted from a joint perspective, good play by the perfidious Royal Air Force.

* Extra Chinook helicopters - Simply excellent news - bringing these to bear quickly is essential.

* reshaping the Army - the loss of 7,000 troops is obviously headline grabbing though difficulties with recruitment made the 100,000 target unobtainable. Rethinking the balance between 'ordinary' soldier and SF generation is crucial to ensuring UK usefulness to its Allies given numbers are simply not happening.

* The fall from six deployable brigades to five leaves only two brigades deployable (on the basis of a third in training, third on deployment, third preparing for Ops) - unless defence planners are treating the three Royal Marine Commandos as a sixth brigade - retaining their own independence in return for playing ball with the Army's deployment schedule ?

* MBT Tank and Heavy Artillery reductions - UK needs to retain skills for high intensity warfare even if it is not on the immediate horizon. A sensible move given the FRES programme was superceded by incremental acquisitions. Replacing Challenger is a big issue and how.

* Reductions in MOD civil servants - challenging insofar as the defence community is increasingly concentrated in areas which have little alternative employment - internal political manoeuvring is going to water this down unless the Government moves fast or keeps its eye on the ball.

Comment on the Guardian article, "Carriers without Harriers: budget cuts leave MoD with jump jet-shaped hole"

Editorial: Comment on the Guardian newspaper article, "Carriers without Harriers: budget cuts leave MoD with jump jet-shaped hole"
October 19th, 2010

The construction costs of a 3billion GBP aircraft carrier over 50 years = 60 million GBP per annum = approx. 1GBP per head of population.

Are we not at risk of getting this out of proportion HMG ? Is this more about 'squaring away' the Scottish Labour class by wounding a programme who final integration is due to occur in the past Prime Minister's constituency. Clearly the new Administration is not playing politics with defence...

Suggestions for employment of the CVF;

1. Launch helicopters to protect British Nationals abroad - does anyone remember the rescue of Brits in Lebanon the other year ? The vessel is three times bigger...

2. Disaster relief in the Commonwealth - imagine the capability to support an isolated community post hurricane / tsunami and so forth.

3. Pursue limited conflicts in support of British interests - Sierra Leone involved an auxiliary tanker as the sole ship on station - what difference the CVF could make...

4. Providing a deck for use by other coalition partners in support of operations in the national interest - far from home base partners will appreciate any 'flat-top' space for running missions from. At sea, invulnerable (except in all-out war with a substantial submarine equipped opponent).

5. A re-run of the Falkland islands campaign no-one would question the utility...

Additionally, what if the Government is being shrewd in its calculations - if the economy picks up will the second vessel still be sold or retained ? The CVA-01 programme was cancelled in the mid-1960s eliminating aircraft carriers - only for the RN to keep the programme going in the shape of the 'through-deck cruiser' which only now is being decommissioned.

Technorati Tags:
Editorial, Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF), Royal Navy, SDSR Review, UK Ministry of Defence

Termination of the UK Defence Training Review ("DTR") Program - Justice belatedly served

Termination of the UK Defence Training Review ("DTR") Program - Justice belatedly served
October 19th, 2010

Today it was announced in the House of Commons that the DTR programme was cancelled (see below for announcement). The intent behind DTR was to outsource a variety of non-battlefield training requirements such as driver training, basic engineering skills and catering to industry for a 30 year period.

The program was split into two 'packages' of training needs - Package One being engineering led and Package Two the less essential, though expensive to execute items.

At the time it could be suggested that it was highly innapropriate for HMG to select a bidder for a publicly funded program in which the Government owned a financial stake - the value of which would vary depending on QinetiQ's business prospects. The Metrix consortium, majority owned by QinetiQ (with a Carlyle Group minority interest) chased a programme to provide training for vehicle drivers, cooks etc. Hardly the forte of a commercial organisation pitching itself as the bastion of British defence science.

Split into two packages, arguably the second was a bone to keep the appearance of competition and result in many pounds spent by bidding teams for a foregone conclusion.

Red Dragon, the DARA aircraft repair facility at St. Athan in South Wales was a real beneficiary of the Wales Labour Party political caucus, who probably like Scotland have no love for the Conservative Government - which is now clearly being repaid in spades....

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The termination of the Defence Training Rationalisation (DTR) project and the Metrix Consortium's appointment as preferred bidder has been announced by Defence Secretary Dr Liam Fox today, 19 October 2010.

The DTR project intended to combine the technical and engineering training for the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force on a single site at St Athan in South Wales.

In a written ministerial statement to Parliament today, Dr Fox said:

"The Metrix Consortium was appointed as preferred bidder in January 2007 subject to it developing an affordable and value for money contract proposal.

"Given the significance of this project and the opportunity to provide a world-class training facility, the Ministry of Defence has worked tirelessly to deliver this project.

"However, it is now clear that Metrix cannot deliver an affordable, commercially-robust proposal within the prescribed period and it has therefore been necessary to terminate the DTR procurement and Metrix's appointment as preferred bidder.

"Technical training, collocated on as few sites as possible, remains in our view the best solution for our Armed Forces. Equally, St Athan was previously chosen as the best location on which to collocate that training for good reasons, and we still hope to base our future defence training solution there.

"We will however now carry out some work before finalising the best way ahead; including to confirm both our training and estates requirement, and the best way to structure the solution that will meet them.

"To ensure momentum is not lost, work on the alternative options will begin as soon as possible and we hope to be able to announce our future plans in the spring."

Training will continue to be delivered at current training locations as it would have done under the original PFI (Private Finance Initiative) proposal. These sites are: Arborfield, Blandford, Bordon, Cosford, Cranwell, Digby, Fareham (Collingwood), Gosport (Sultan) and St Athan.

Technorati Tags:
Defence Budget, UK Ministry of Defence

UK Releases NSS review document: A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy

UK Releases NSS review document: A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy
October 18th, 2010

Ahead of the release by the Prime Minister of the outcome of the SDSR Defence Review in the House of Commons at 1530hrs GMT (0930 EST) came the release of the foreign policy-led component known as The National Security Strategy (Command Paper Cm7953). A few comments jump off the page at first pass;

The foreword at the outset refers to Britain being both more secure and more vulnerable then ever before which seems to automatically question the logic of cutting resources to security needs. If national security assets are an insurance policy then Britain seems to be going down the "third party, fire & theft" route.

Page four sees The United States of America listed atop that of the international network of alliances, followed by the EU and NATO.

Page five refers to equipment acquisition rooted in the mindset of the Cold War.

KEY POINT: Page nine, a definition of the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, "to use all our national capabilities to build Britain's prosperity, extend our nation's influence in the world and strengthen our security. The networks we use to build our prosperity we will also use to build our security".

Page eleven identifies the top four threats in the next five years to UK security; terrorism (including CBRN (i.e. WMD) usage) and interesting flags Northern Ireland as a flashpoint, cyberattack, military crises and major accident or natural hazard.

Page thirteen identifies withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2015 - towards the end of the next US Presidency, and to the end of the first term of a Cameron Government, should the Government go the full five years before seeking re-election.

page fifteen (section 1.15) identifies the need to broaden out UK relationships beyond dependence on the USA and the world becomes more multi-polar.

page twenty-two (section 2.11) reaffirms the UK view of the Special Relationship - "Our strong defence relationship with the US... is exceptionally close and central to our national interest".

page twenty-seven - illustration of a 'risk register' of 15 major risks - which will be reviewed and updated biannually. The methodology (which is a two-by-two "impact:likelihood" matrix standard to any management consultant) is printed on page 37 for those unfamiliar.

UK SDSR Defence Review outcomes - a matter of arithmetic ? Monday 18th October, 2010 There is much being trailed as to the release today by Prime Minister David Cameron as to the outcome of the review of resources devoted to the Ministry of Defence. Traditionally the Conservative Party are keen to be seen as strong and safe on defence and foreign policy. In an environment where substantial cuts are being made across government showing a grip on the issues, especially for a new administration is key. Which probably explains why the Departmental minister has been sidelined by No.10 which has taken strong control (through the Cabinet Office) of the defence review process. press sources are already trailing the following adjustments to UK force structure; * Retirement of the VSTOL Harrier (known as the AV-8B by the US) jump jet <a href="http://www.cityam.com/news-and-analysis/thousands-troops-go-defence-cuts">(CityAM)</a> * Retirement of HMS Ark Royal (Aircraft carrier and flagship of the Royal Navy) <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11570593">(BBC)</a> * Reductions to the strength of the British Army of the order of two brigades (7,000 troops) <a href="http://www.cityam.com/news-and-analysis/thousands-troops-go-defence-cuts">(CityAM)</a> The consensus which appears to have been trailed to the UK media and which seems uncontested by the Opposition is that cuts to the budget will amount to some 7-8% versus some 20% in other Government Departments (excluding health). Given that insiders acknowledge off-the-record that the MOD budget has been running some 10% beyond its resource level this would imply a 10.0 + 8.0% = 18.0% reduction. Hence the need for the PM to lead this announcement. What this means for UK 'Grand Strategy' remains to be seen as the National Security Strategy (NSS) seems to be headlining on the threat to UK global interests from cyber attack.

UK SDSR Defence Review outcomes - a matter of arithmetic ?
Monday 18th October, 2010

There is much being trailed as to the release today by Prime Minister David Cameron as to the outcome of the review of resources devoted to the Ministry of Defence. Traditionally the Conservative Party are keen to be seen as strong and safe on defence and foreign policy. In an environment where substantial cuts are being made across government showing a grip on the issues, especially for a new administration is key.

Which probably explains why the Departmental minister has been sidelined by No.10 which has taken strong control (through the Cabinet Office) of the defence review process. press sources are already trailing the following adjustments to UK force structure;

* Retirement of the VSTOL Harrier (known as the AV-8B by the US) jump jet (CityAM)
* Retirement of HMS Ark Royal (Aircraft carrier and flagship of the Royal Navy) (BBC)
* Reductions to the strength of the British Army of the order of two brigades (7,000 troops) (CityAM)

The consensus which appears to have been trailed to the UK media and which seems uncontested by the Opposition is that cuts to the budget will amount to some 7-8% versus some 20% in other Government Departments (excluding health).

Given that insiders acknowledge off-the-record that the MOD budget has been running some 10% beyond its resource level this would imply a 10.0 + 8.0% = 18.0% reduction.

Hence the need for the PM to lead this announcement. What this means for UK 'Grand Strategy' remains to be seen as the National Security Strategy (NSS) seems to be headlining on the threat to UK global interests from cyber attack.

Editorial: Financial Times newspaper (October 12, 2010) - Lex: Defence M&A

With regard to the 'Defence M&A' item in the Lex column (FT October 12, 2010) one wonders if, for the government customer, that the pharmaceutical industry holds elements of a model applicable to defence.

The reliance of the major players on small incubator companies - taking risk and creating drugs needed in the real world - which when sufficiently refined are taken on board by the major pharma companies who have the advantages of production, distribution, customer relationships etc.

The likes of the UK MoD and DoD trying to evolve procurement methods such as 'spiral development', 'urgent operational requirements' etc. begs for a different approach.

Simply calling for break-up of a large clique is politically as likely as breaking up Goldman Sachs - like the atom bomb - consolidation in defence cannot be wound back.