The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report in May 2009 "Alternatives for modernizing U.S. Fighter forces" grapples with options should, basically, the Joint Strike fighter (JSF) or F-35 program be cancelled.
Interestingly the report makes the point that US Marine Corp concerns about the 2018 in-service date slippage for their own AV-8B Harrier replacement, "instead of being retired as F-35's are delivered to the Marine Corps, AV-8B's would be retained as long as they are flight-worthy" (page XIII). This is in contrast to the United Kingdom, whom as part of the outcome of a recent, resources-led review decided to scrap the Harrier capability ahead of the introduction of a new generation aircraft carrier.
US Marine Corps plans are all based on retaining the AV-8B Harrier through 9,500 airframe hours (page 10).
The report then makes the killer blow (on page 13), "The Marine Corps AV-8B's were purchased (or remanufactured and upgraded) more recently than many F/A-18 A/B/C/D's of more modern design and, hence, have substantial remaining service life"
One of the big alternatives touted in UK circles to the JSF or navalised Eurofighter typhoon is the F-18 Hornet (which would be bought from the US). Why on earth does the RN not lease or buy some of the US aircraft and fly them until they reach the limit of serviceability ?
For the USMC with the resources they can consider the Harrier as obsolete on the modern battlefield. However many of the scenarios for which the is organising would be 'lower intensity' by definition - for which aproven airframe like Harrier is an essential force multiplier.
Alternatively, as was already suggested in 2007, why not manufacture new Harriers under licence in India ? BAE Systems are seeking to carve out a niche in the emerging Indian defence market and US is deploying the President on a major tour (which must chafe the FCO)...
Thursday, November 11, 2010
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
Whither Close Air Support assets for UK Joint Operations
Whither Close Air Support assets for UK Joint Operations
November 10, 2010
Close Air Support (CAS) or TACAIR as the American Armed Forces refer to it, is a highly skilled mission applying aerial firepower against targets in close contact with infantry and Marines on the battlefield.
The application of precision guidance to bombs and traditionally unguided munitions makes this mission massively important. Add to that the need for close working and communication between troops on the ground in contact and the pilot and you have a highly complex ecosystem which, if disrupted can render CAS impotent as a military capability.
Hence the post-decision uproar concerning the end of the Harrier VSTOL ("jump jet") force in the United Kingdom. Whilst there have been leaps and bounds in helicopter gunship support post the Gulf War of 1991, helicopters remain vulnerable to jet aircraft over the battlefield, lacking speed of engagement for one. The Harrier has been a unique asset, able to operate in very rough environments and take off without the need for any significant runway. A group of retired veterans of the Falklands War of 1982 have protested publicly the loss of the Harrier which totally emasculates Naval aviation for the foreseeable future.
The Apache AH-64 gunship in service finally with the Army Air Corps has become the principal close support direct fire (as opposed to indirect artillery) asset for the British Armed forces.
The sad truth underpinning this argument is the fact that deciding the successor to Harrier has been left low in the in-tray in favour of securing Aircraft Carriers, Eurofighter combat aircraft and other programs. Whilst in every spreadsheet metric the Joint Strike Fighter offered a superior capability, one day, at a price per unit to be determined - its qualitative flexibility has been left to one side.
The Harrier is truly a venerable asset and probably JSF will be in turn challenged by the Moore's Law-like development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. The military themselves know the shelf-life of an aircraft and, one suspects, were delinquent in leaving decisions over its future to the fast-jet fraternity of the Royal Air Force - who have no place in their future for close air support.
The Americans had a similar problem with the A-10 Thunderbolt (or "Warthog"). Unloved by the US Air Force it was put on the back burner and then, once conflict recommences in Iraq, it becomes a key support capability to the Army and Marines and upgraded to A-10C standard.
The failure of the British Defence Establishment, leaving decisions over the fleet held by the RAF, to the RAF dooms capabilities such as close air support leads to discussion pieces like this, whilst military capabilities are being turned into razor blades.
November 10, 2010
Close Air Support (CAS) or TACAIR as the American Armed Forces refer to it, is a highly skilled mission applying aerial firepower against targets in close contact with infantry and Marines on the battlefield.
The application of precision guidance to bombs and traditionally unguided munitions makes this mission massively important. Add to that the need for close working and communication between troops on the ground in contact and the pilot and you have a highly complex ecosystem which, if disrupted can render CAS impotent as a military capability.
Hence the post-decision uproar concerning the end of the Harrier VSTOL ("jump jet") force in the United Kingdom. Whilst there have been leaps and bounds in helicopter gunship support post the Gulf War of 1991, helicopters remain vulnerable to jet aircraft over the battlefield, lacking speed of engagement for one. The Harrier has been a unique asset, able to operate in very rough environments and take off without the need for any significant runway. A group of retired veterans of the Falklands War of 1982 have protested publicly the loss of the Harrier which totally emasculates Naval aviation for the foreseeable future.
The Apache AH-64 gunship in service finally with the Army Air Corps has become the principal close support direct fire (as opposed to indirect artillery) asset for the British Armed forces.
The sad truth underpinning this argument is the fact that deciding the successor to Harrier has been left low in the in-tray in favour of securing Aircraft Carriers, Eurofighter combat aircraft and other programs. Whilst in every spreadsheet metric the Joint Strike Fighter offered a superior capability, one day, at a price per unit to be determined - its qualitative flexibility has been left to one side.
The Harrier is truly a venerable asset and probably JSF will be in turn challenged by the Moore's Law-like development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. The military themselves know the shelf-life of an aircraft and, one suspects, were delinquent in leaving decisions over its future to the fast-jet fraternity of the Royal Air Force - who have no place in their future for close air support.
The Americans had a similar problem with the A-10 Thunderbolt (or "Warthog"). Unloved by the US Air Force it was put on the back burner and then, once conflict recommences in Iraq, it becomes a key support capability to the Army and Marines and upgraded to A-10C standard.
The failure of the British Defence Establishment, leaving decisions over the fleet held by the RAF, to the RAF dooms capabilities such as close air support leads to discussion pieces like this, whilst military capabilities are being turned into razor blades.
Thursday, November 4, 2010
Anglo-French Defence Cooperation: Last refuge of the scoundrel
Anglo-French Defence Cooperation: Last refuge of the scoundrel is defence collaboration (with apologies to Samuel Johnson)November 4th, 2010
Faced with economic challenges the British and French Governments recently met and signed a treaty which had probably been under preparation since the summer to find any way to share defence resources without creating dependency between one another.
Anglo-French defence arrangements always seem to come to the fore when the chips are down, only to disolve when the situation picks up. Think about the 1960s and the development of the Jaguar aircraft for example. In the 1991 Gulf War the aircraft had more capability that the more-modern Tornado (laser designation for one) thoguh of course it was the first casualty of defence cuts. Also think of the Puma helicopter, dumped in favour of the Chinook etc.
The measures agreed between the UK and France include (bullet points below are directly from the UK MOD website - italicised comments those of the author):
• jointly developing a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) as a non-standing bilateral capability able to carry out a range of operations in the future whether acting bilaterally or through NATO, the EU or other coalition arrangements - this concept will be developed over the coming years;
Paper staff exercise. No cost. No commitment. Note timescale is 'coming years'
• building primarily on maritime task group co-operation around the French carrier Charles de Gaulle - the UK and France will aim to have, by the early 2020s, the ability to deploy a UK-French integrated carrier strike group incorporating assets owned by both countries;
As soon as 10 years away. It would seem to be that the RN will be providing air defence pickets and submarines to train as they lack CV capability in the coming years (if not already). No cost savings benefit. political statement though useful for training RN.
• developing joint military doctrine and training programmes;
Little cost. some joint training probably already occurs under NATO auspices.
• extending bilateral co-operation on the acquisition of equipment and technologies, for example in unmanned aerial systems, complex weapons, submarine technologies, satellite communications and research and technology;
Watchkeeper UAV program from Thales must feel like it has brought back from the dead given the hype around BAE System's Taranis this past Farnborough 2010. Collaboration on equipment procurement has, by rule of thumb, always taken longer, cost more, and been of dubious military utility - however the saving grace is that it insulates against political cancellation.
• aligning wherever possible our logistics arrangements - including providing spares and support to the new A400M transport aircraft;
Some cost savings once A400M is in service. I saw my first mockup of the A400M at Farnborough in 1990.
• developing a stronger defence industrial and technology base; and
A hardly substantial statement of intent.
• enhancing joint working to defend against emerging security concerns such as cyber security.
Surely one would want to work with the Americans on this - IT & France ??
So in summary the devil must be in the detail as the UK MOD makes no reference to joint sharing around the nuclear deterrent capability each nation possesses explicitly other than a passing reference to submarines (all RN submarines are nuclear) and strengthening R&T efforts.
Thursday, October 28, 2010
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) - Through Life Management Costs forecast to rise
In Testimony concerning the US Department of Defense 2011 Funding Authorization onFebruary 2nd, 2010, "NAVAIR recently determined that the Marine Corps and the Navy’s version of the Joint Strike Fighter may end up being too expensive to operate, with each flight hour flown costing about $31,000, compared with around $19,000 for a flight hour for the service’s current F/A-18 Hornets and AV-8B Harriers."
For the United Kingdom's recently completed Strategic Defence Review (named SDSR to differentiate it from the 1998 SDR), this data is somewhat problematic.
A decision to reduce the carrier programme and JSF buy serves logically to increase the unit costs of the aircraft and ship(s) procured. This data substantially affects the through-life costings into maintaining the fleet of JSF aircraft by the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force.
One of the SDSR decisions is to retire the Harrier aircraft which means not only will Fleet Air Arm pilots on the new carrier(s) lack familiarity with carrier flight ops though also it will be more expensive. Factor in the challenges around Carrier Strike Group re-supply and the fact that the CVF design was fitted for however not with steam catapults could have been a good example of foresight making it through the procurement system.
Tuesday, October 26, 2010
The aircraft carrier debate & Australia moving 500 miles Westwards: Plus-ca-change
The aircraft carrier debate & Australia moving 500 miles Westwards: Plus-ca-change
October 26, 2010
As part of my PhD research which was funded via a scholarship from funds made available by the Ministry of Defence I looked into the issues, theories and dynamics of strategic decision making applying my model and others to the latest available material from the archives of the Public Records Office.
At the time the latest materials concerned the 'Healey Reviews' of the mid 1960s which heralded a period of substantial British military and political disengagement from its 'East of Suez' commitments. One of the strongest threads running through the period was the battles between the armed services over resources and key programmes - of which the most contentious were the Royal Air Force's TSR-2 aircraft and the Royal Navy next generation aircraft carrier programme, known as CVA-01.
The CVA-01 was revolutionary, large and designed to support power projection for decades to come. The island (control tower) was offset so that aircraft could taxi around it. The displacement was substantial - and at a time of financial crisis - it was, like the TSR-2 too expensive.
Something had to go and the Royal Navy at least had a champion in terms of the first officer appointed to the new position of Chief of Defence Staff in the newly (April 1st, 1964) Ministry of Defence - Lord Mountbatten - the archtypal sailor.
To supplement the output of the archives - which includes various passionate memos to the Secretary of State from 1st Sea Lord and Chief of the Air Staff I studied the organisational directories of the time and identified two persons to interview. One was the Military Assistant to Lord Mountbatten, an aircraft carrier captain himself. The other was a junior civil servant working with the staff of CAS - whom would go on to become Permanent Under Secretary of the Department, Michael Quinlan.
At stake in the battle was the crucial issue - could aircraft (ie. TSR-2) conduct the missions using an air basing strategy of airfields around the world conduct the tasks of carrier-borne aviation ? Aircraft carriers, the air complement and logistics tail needed to support them was and remains in the current debates an expensive proposition. fields of concrete on land could prove a lot cheaper. The counter-arguments were many and of them several held great weight - which brings us to the urban legend at the heart of the mid-1960s defence reviews - that the Royal Air Force moved Australia 500 miles West to justify their strategy could obviate the requirement for investment in CVA-01 - with the consequence that the carrier programme should be cancelled in favour of investment in TSR-2.
My interviews sought to clarify this episode for research sake though also for my own curiousity. The Americans pushed strenuously for Britain to maintain forces East of Suez, even offering an aircraft carrier cheaply for the RN to use to keep them in the game - which in the archives was discounted 'due to inadequate messing [dining] arrangements'. Although my interview suggested that the configuration of arrestor wires might have been a greater factor at the operational level.
Mountbatten's MA was sprightly and still possessed strong memories of the event. He remembered clearly a presentation from CAS which looked somewhat odd to a man who has spent most of his life pouring over admiralty charts. Excusing himself from the presentation he pulled a map which showed that the type of projection being used by the RAF enabled Australia to conveniently fit into the flight peformance envelope of the TSR-2, thus justifying the strategy. The MA advised Mountbatten, pulling him out of the meeting on another pretext and the game was up.
Meeting Michael Quinlan during a visit to the Royal Military College of Science was, on reflection a great opportunity. I would like to think that I genuinely caught him off guard with him expecting me to ask a variety of questions concerning the 1990 options-for-change review, the personal dynamics of which were colourfully captured in Alan Clark's Diaries.
His view differed and a few weeks after meeting him a two page letter with a long quotation I was free to use in my research appeared. Sir Michael's view was that,
"In a genuine mistake, soon detected and rectified, an officer in the Air Staff based certain calculations about the capabilities of land-based air power on a figure some hundreds of miles too short for the distance between the Indian Ocean island of Aldabra - then under consideration for development as an air base - and a hypothetical operational area on the mainland of Africa. The episode (which later became, sometimes with embellishment. a treasured Royal Navy anecdote) was indignantly seized upon by the Naval Staff as evidence of Air Staff duplicity. This illustrates the level of feeling and tension which the review generated between the two Services".
So who was right ? Ultimately, and I might suggest that this be the real lesson, that inter-service rivalry delayed decisions being made before the resource constraints hammer really fell on the Ministry. CVA-01 was cancelled. TSR-2 was cancelled. The RAF proposed buying US F-111 swing-wing bombers - and that was cancelled too due to resources cuts and an IMF crisis.
Playing a very minor industrial role during the early stages of the CVF programme one can look back and see, post-SDSR, that delaying decision-making in a quest for the best military solution can risk ending up with a very compromised solution downstream. Years of prevarication I am sure are regretted from the corridors of the Ministry, to CINC Fleet Headquarters to industry balance sheets, ship building union offices and ultimately the communities of men and women simply trying to make a living.
The original in-service dates I remember for CVA-01 and CVA-02 were 2010 and 2012 respectively. Just to think that had the deadlines been held the SDSR would have been completed with one aircraft carrier having been recently or imminently launched by a senior member of the Royal Family with the newly elected administration in full attendance.
cest tragic. Should you wish to read in greater detail my own research into the defence policy battles of the mid 1960s I should like to point you to a copy of my PhD research at:
(Full copy of my PhD research thesis)
(A more concise version of the story published by the UK Defence Forum)
(A presentation to military students concerning TSR-2 versus CVA-01)
Technorati Tags: Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF), SDSR Review, UK Ministry of Defence
October 26, 2010
As part of my PhD research which was funded via a scholarship from funds made available by the Ministry of Defence I looked into the issues, theories and dynamics of strategic decision making applying my model and others to the latest available material from the archives of the Public Records Office.
At the time the latest materials concerned the 'Healey Reviews' of the mid 1960s which heralded a period of substantial British military and political disengagement from its 'East of Suez' commitments. One of the strongest threads running through the period was the battles between the armed services over resources and key programmes - of which the most contentious were the Royal Air Force's TSR-2 aircraft and the Royal Navy next generation aircraft carrier programme, known as CVA-01.
The CVA-01 was revolutionary, large and designed to support power projection for decades to come. The island (control tower) was offset so that aircraft could taxi around it. The displacement was substantial - and at a time of financial crisis - it was, like the TSR-2 too expensive.
Something had to go and the Royal Navy at least had a champion in terms of the first officer appointed to the new position of Chief of Defence Staff in the newly (April 1st, 1964) Ministry of Defence - Lord Mountbatten - the archtypal sailor.
To supplement the output of the archives - which includes various passionate memos to the Secretary of State from 1st Sea Lord and Chief of the Air Staff I studied the organisational directories of the time and identified two persons to interview. One was the Military Assistant to Lord Mountbatten, an aircraft carrier captain himself. The other was a junior civil servant working with the staff of CAS - whom would go on to become Permanent Under Secretary of the Department, Michael Quinlan.
At stake in the battle was the crucial issue - could aircraft (ie. TSR-2) conduct the missions using an air basing strategy of airfields around the world conduct the tasks of carrier-borne aviation ? Aircraft carriers, the air complement and logistics tail needed to support them was and remains in the current debates an expensive proposition. fields of concrete on land could prove a lot cheaper. The counter-arguments were many and of them several held great weight - which brings us to the urban legend at the heart of the mid-1960s defence reviews - that the Royal Air Force moved Australia 500 miles West to justify their strategy could obviate the requirement for investment in CVA-01 - with the consequence that the carrier programme should be cancelled in favour of investment in TSR-2.
My interviews sought to clarify this episode for research sake though also for my own curiousity. The Americans pushed strenuously for Britain to maintain forces East of Suez, even offering an aircraft carrier cheaply for the RN to use to keep them in the game - which in the archives was discounted 'due to inadequate messing [dining] arrangements'. Although my interview suggested that the configuration of arrestor wires might have been a greater factor at the operational level.
Mountbatten's MA was sprightly and still possessed strong memories of the event. He remembered clearly a presentation from CAS which looked somewhat odd to a man who has spent most of his life pouring over admiralty charts. Excusing himself from the presentation he pulled a map which showed that the type of projection being used by the RAF enabled Australia to conveniently fit into the flight peformance envelope of the TSR-2, thus justifying the strategy. The MA advised Mountbatten, pulling him out of the meeting on another pretext and the game was up.
Meeting Michael Quinlan during a visit to the Royal Military College of Science was, on reflection a great opportunity. I would like to think that I genuinely caught him off guard with him expecting me to ask a variety of questions concerning the 1990 options-for-change review, the personal dynamics of which were colourfully captured in Alan Clark's Diaries.
His view differed and a few weeks after meeting him a two page letter with a long quotation I was free to use in my research appeared. Sir Michael's view was that,
"In a genuine mistake, soon detected and rectified, an officer in the Air Staff based certain calculations about the capabilities of land-based air power on a figure some hundreds of miles too short for the distance between the Indian Ocean island of Aldabra - then under consideration for development as an air base - and a hypothetical operational area on the mainland of Africa. The episode (which later became, sometimes with embellishment. a treasured Royal Navy anecdote) was indignantly seized upon by the Naval Staff as evidence of Air Staff duplicity. This illustrates the level of feeling and tension which the review generated between the two Services".
So who was right ? Ultimately, and I might suggest that this be the real lesson, that inter-service rivalry delayed decisions being made before the resource constraints hammer really fell on the Ministry. CVA-01 was cancelled. TSR-2 was cancelled. The RAF proposed buying US F-111 swing-wing bombers - and that was cancelled too due to resources cuts and an IMF crisis.
Playing a very minor industrial role during the early stages of the CVF programme one can look back and see, post-SDSR, that delaying decision-making in a quest for the best military solution can risk ending up with a very compromised solution downstream. Years of prevarication I am sure are regretted from the corridors of the Ministry, to CINC Fleet Headquarters to industry balance sheets, ship building union offices and ultimately the communities of men and women simply trying to make a living.
The original in-service dates I remember for CVA-01 and CVA-02 were 2010 and 2012 respectively. Just to think that had the deadlines been held the SDSR would have been completed with one aircraft carrier having been recently or imminently launched by a senior member of the Royal Family with the newly elected administration in full attendance.
cest tragic. Should you wish to read in greater detail my own research into the defence policy battles of the mid 1960s I should like to point you to a copy of my PhD research at:
(Full copy of my PhD research thesis)
(A more concise version of the story published by the UK Defence Forum)
(A presentation to military students concerning TSR-2 versus CVA-01)
Technorati Tags: Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF), SDSR Review, UK Ministry of Defence
Tuesday, October 19, 2010
Commentary on the unveiling of UK MOD SDSR Review
Commentary on the unveiling of UK MOD SDSR Review
October 19th, 2010
Prime Minister David Cameron unveiled the outcome of the Spending Review for the Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom earlier today.
A scorecard approach to the key points covered by the BBC News website runs as follows;
* "8% cut in real terms" - Does this exclude the MoD running over budget by approximately 10% ? If not, then the cuts are approximately 20% and this exercise represents political theatre.
* "RAF and RN numbers to be reduced" - For the RAF closing bases reduces headcount and is desirable - in the end aircraft availability is the only criteria for size. For the RN it is a little more problematic (as outlined below).
* "HMS Ark Royal will be decommissioned four years early" - The issue for the RN is how will they staff properly the new carrier(s) when they finally come down the slipway ? As usual there is more 'lust' in terms of wanting the capability than there is through-life management.
* "Surface fleet cut from 24 to 19" - A graph drawn for me a few years ago during a meeting a main building showed the trend in the fall of the Fleet since the 1960s - the logical outcome was a surface fleet of 16 - you read it here first ! The key question is how do you protect the carriers and replenishment vessels - with a couple of ships (best case) in dry-dock at a time seventeen ships covering 70% of the Earth's surface is challenging.
* Astute untouched - VERY good news as they will be key for special operations, surveillance and producing effect.
* "Trident delay" - Tolerable as long as the Astute drumbeat can be synchronised to ensure minimal loss of manufacturing skills (and pressure from the supply chain to maximise profit). The reduction in warheads is interesting and suggests cutting the numbers to fit a stretched Astute SSBN design. Vanguard has 16 missile tubes, each capable of carrying 8 warheads (under the START Treaty) implying each missile has 3 warheads. 40 warheads implies 10 tubes each with four warheads and associated shrinkage of the vessel's length (plus some simplification in terms of engineering and obviously, cost). That said Personally this Editor would favour stretching Astute acquisition using nuclear tipped Tomahawk TLAM missiles.
* Closure of RAF Kinloss and Nimrod to be retired - Sad news for the Scottish community - and no doubt the lack of Conservative support was an issue. Nimrod is technologically being outpaced by the likes of the Global Hawk UAV, and time needs to move on. Political pain around the tragic loss of a Nimrod in Afghanistan likely contributed to the decision to retire.
* Harrier retirement and Tornado part retirement - RAF should shed themselves of Tornado at a faster rate than Harrier. This move smacks of a play by the Air Marshals given Harrier is a joint force. Losing Harrier substantially ahead of JSF introduction will kill the skill level of the Fleet Air Arm operating from the new CVF. Very shortsighted from a joint perspective, good play by the perfidious Royal Air Force.
* Extra Chinook helicopters - Simply excellent news - bringing these to bear quickly is essential.
* reshaping the Army - the loss of 7,000 troops is obviously headline grabbing though difficulties with recruitment made the 100,000 target unobtainable. Rethinking the balance between 'ordinary' soldier and SF generation is crucial to ensuring UK usefulness to its Allies given numbers are simply not happening.
* The fall from six deployable brigades to five leaves only two brigades deployable (on the basis of a third in training, third on deployment, third preparing for Ops) - unless defence planners are treating the three Royal Marine Commandos as a sixth brigade - retaining their own independence in return for playing ball with the Army's deployment schedule ?
* MBT Tank and Heavy Artillery reductions - UK needs to retain skills for high intensity warfare even if it is not on the immediate horizon. A sensible move given the FRES programme was superceded by incremental acquisitions. Replacing Challenger is a big issue and how.
* Reductions in MOD civil servants - challenging insofar as the defence community is increasingly concentrated in areas which have little alternative employment - internal political manoeuvring is going to water this down unless the Government moves fast or keeps its eye on the ball.
October 19th, 2010
Prime Minister David Cameron unveiled the outcome of the Spending Review for the Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom earlier today.
A scorecard approach to the key points covered by the BBC News website runs as follows;
* "8% cut in real terms" - Does this exclude the MoD running over budget by approximately 10% ? If not, then the cuts are approximately 20% and this exercise represents political theatre.
* "RAF and RN numbers to be reduced" - For the RAF closing bases reduces headcount and is desirable - in the end aircraft availability is the only criteria for size. For the RN it is a little more problematic (as outlined below).
* "HMS Ark Royal will be decommissioned four years early" - The issue for the RN is how will they staff properly the new carrier(s) when they finally come down the slipway ? As usual there is more 'lust' in terms of wanting the capability than there is through-life management.
* "Surface fleet cut from 24 to 19" - A graph drawn for me a few years ago during a meeting a main building showed the trend in the fall of the Fleet since the 1960s - the logical outcome was a surface fleet of 16 - you read it here first ! The key question is how do you protect the carriers and replenishment vessels - with a couple of ships (best case) in dry-dock at a time seventeen ships covering 70% of the Earth's surface is challenging.
* Astute untouched - VERY good news as they will be key for special operations, surveillance and producing effect.
* "Trident delay" - Tolerable as long as the Astute drumbeat can be synchronised to ensure minimal loss of manufacturing skills (and pressure from the supply chain to maximise profit). The reduction in warheads is interesting and suggests cutting the numbers to fit a stretched Astute SSBN design. Vanguard has 16 missile tubes, each capable of carrying 8 warheads (under the START Treaty) implying each missile has 3 warheads. 40 warheads implies 10 tubes each with four warheads and associated shrinkage of the vessel's length (plus some simplification in terms of engineering and obviously, cost). That said Personally this Editor would favour stretching Astute acquisition using nuclear tipped Tomahawk TLAM missiles.
* Closure of RAF Kinloss and Nimrod to be retired - Sad news for the Scottish community - and no doubt the lack of Conservative support was an issue. Nimrod is technologically being outpaced by the likes of the Global Hawk UAV, and time needs to move on. Political pain around the tragic loss of a Nimrod in Afghanistan likely contributed to the decision to retire.
* Harrier retirement and Tornado part retirement - RAF should shed themselves of Tornado at a faster rate than Harrier. This move smacks of a play by the Air Marshals given Harrier is a joint force. Losing Harrier substantially ahead of JSF introduction will kill the skill level of the Fleet Air Arm operating from the new CVF. Very shortsighted from a joint perspective, good play by the perfidious Royal Air Force.
* Extra Chinook helicopters - Simply excellent news - bringing these to bear quickly is essential.
* reshaping the Army - the loss of 7,000 troops is obviously headline grabbing though difficulties with recruitment made the 100,000 target unobtainable. Rethinking the balance between 'ordinary' soldier and SF generation is crucial to ensuring UK usefulness to its Allies given numbers are simply not happening.
* The fall from six deployable brigades to five leaves only two brigades deployable (on the basis of a third in training, third on deployment, third preparing for Ops) - unless defence planners are treating the three Royal Marine Commandos as a sixth brigade - retaining their own independence in return for playing ball with the Army's deployment schedule ?
* MBT Tank and Heavy Artillery reductions - UK needs to retain skills for high intensity warfare even if it is not on the immediate horizon. A sensible move given the FRES programme was superceded by incremental acquisitions. Replacing Challenger is a big issue and how.
* Reductions in MOD civil servants - challenging insofar as the defence community is increasingly concentrated in areas which have little alternative employment - internal political manoeuvring is going to water this down unless the Government moves fast or keeps its eye on the ball.
Comment on the Guardian article, "Carriers without Harriers: budget cuts leave MoD with jump jet-shaped hole"
Editorial: Comment on the Guardian newspaper article, "Carriers without Harriers: budget cuts leave MoD with jump jet-shaped hole"
October 19th, 2010
The construction costs of a 3billion GBP aircraft carrier over 50 years = 60 million GBP per annum = approx. 1GBP per head of population.
Are we not at risk of getting this out of proportion HMG ? Is this more about 'squaring away' the Scottish Labour class by wounding a programme who final integration is due to occur in the past Prime Minister's constituency. Clearly the new Administration is not playing politics with defence...
Suggestions for employment of the CVF;
1. Launch helicopters to protect British Nationals abroad - does anyone remember the rescue of Brits in Lebanon the other year ? The vessel is three times bigger...
2. Disaster relief in the Commonwealth - imagine the capability to support an isolated community post hurricane / tsunami and so forth.
3. Pursue limited conflicts in support of British interests - Sierra Leone involved an auxiliary tanker as the sole ship on station - what difference the CVF could make...
4. Providing a deck for use by other coalition partners in support of operations in the national interest - far from home base partners will appreciate any 'flat-top' space for running missions from. At sea, invulnerable (except in all-out war with a substantial submarine equipped opponent).
5. A re-run of the Falkland islands campaign no-one would question the utility...
Additionally, what if the Government is being shrewd in its calculations - if the economy picks up will the second vessel still be sold or retained ? The CVA-01 programme was cancelled in the mid-1960s eliminating aircraft carriers - only for the RN to keep the programme going in the shape of the 'through-deck cruiser' which only now is being decommissioned.
October 19th, 2010
The construction costs of a 3billion GBP aircraft carrier over 50 years = 60 million GBP per annum = approx. 1GBP per head of population.
Are we not at risk of getting this out of proportion HMG ? Is this more about 'squaring away' the Scottish Labour class by wounding a programme who final integration is due to occur in the past Prime Minister's constituency. Clearly the new Administration is not playing politics with defence...
Suggestions for employment of the CVF;
1. Launch helicopters to protect British Nationals abroad - does anyone remember the rescue of Brits in Lebanon the other year ? The vessel is three times bigger...
2. Disaster relief in the Commonwealth - imagine the capability to support an isolated community post hurricane / tsunami and so forth.
3. Pursue limited conflicts in support of British interests - Sierra Leone involved an auxiliary tanker as the sole ship on station - what difference the CVF could make...
4. Providing a deck for use by other coalition partners in support of operations in the national interest - far from home base partners will appreciate any 'flat-top' space for running missions from. At sea, invulnerable (except in all-out war with a substantial submarine equipped opponent).
5. A re-run of the Falkland islands campaign no-one would question the utility...
Additionally, what if the Government is being shrewd in its calculations - if the economy picks up will the second vessel still be sold or retained ? The CVA-01 programme was cancelled in the mid-1960s eliminating aircraft carriers - only for the RN to keep the programme going in the shape of the 'through-deck cruiser' which only now is being decommissioned.
Technorati Tags:
Editorial, Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF), Royal Navy, SDSR Review, UK Ministry of Defence
Termination of the UK Defence Training Review ("DTR") Program - Justice belatedly served
Termination of the UK Defence Training Review ("DTR") Program - Justice belatedly servedOctober 19th, 2010
Today it was announced in the House of Commons that the DTR programme was cancelled (see below for announcement). The intent behind DTR was to outsource a variety of non-battlefield training requirements such as driver training, basic engineering skills and catering to industry for a 30 year period.
The program was split into two 'packages' of training needs - Package One being engineering led and Package Two the less essential, though expensive to execute items.
At the time it could be suggested that it was highly innapropriate for HMG to select a bidder for a publicly funded program in which the Government owned a financial stake - the value of which would vary depending on QinetiQ's business prospects. The Metrix consortium, majority owned by QinetiQ (with a Carlyle Group minority interest) chased a programme to provide training for vehicle drivers, cooks etc. Hardly the forte of a commercial organisation pitching itself as the bastion of British defence science.
Split into two packages, arguably the second was a bone to keep the appearance of competition and result in many pounds spent by bidding teams for a foregone conclusion.
Red Dragon, the DARA aircraft repair facility at St. Athan in South Wales was a real beneficiary of the Wales Labour Party political caucus, who probably like Scotland have no love for the Conservative Government - which is now clearly being repaid in spades....
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The termination of the Defence Training Rationalisation (DTR) project and the Metrix Consortium's appointment as preferred bidder has been announced by Defence Secretary Dr Liam Fox today, 19 October 2010.
The DTR project intended to combine the technical and engineering training for the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force on a single site at St Athan in South Wales.
In a written ministerial statement to Parliament today, Dr Fox said:
"The Metrix Consortium was appointed as preferred bidder in January 2007 subject to it developing an affordable and value for money contract proposal.
"Given the significance of this project and the opportunity to provide a world-class training facility, the Ministry of Defence has worked tirelessly to deliver this project.
"However, it is now clear that Metrix cannot deliver an affordable, commercially-robust proposal within the prescribed period and it has therefore been necessary to terminate the DTR procurement and Metrix's appointment as preferred bidder.
"Technical training, collocated on as few sites as possible, remains in our view the best solution for our Armed Forces. Equally, St Athan was previously chosen as the best location on which to collocate that training for good reasons, and we still hope to base our future defence training solution there.
"We will however now carry out some work before finalising the best way ahead; including to confirm both our training and estates requirement, and the best way to structure the solution that will meet them.
"To ensure momentum is not lost, work on the alternative options will begin as soon as possible and we hope to be able to announce our future plans in the spring."
Training will continue to be delivered at current training locations as it would have done under the original PFI (Private Finance Initiative) proposal. These sites are: Arborfield, Blandford, Bordon, Cosford, Cranwell, Digby, Fareham (Collingwood), Gosport (Sultan) and St Athan.
At the time it could be suggested that it was highly innapropriate for HMG to select a bidder for a publicly funded program in which the Government owned a financial stake - the value of which would vary depending on QinetiQ's business prospects. The Metrix consortium, majority owned by QinetiQ (with a Carlyle Group minority interest) chased a programme to provide training for vehicle drivers, cooks etc. Hardly the forte of a commercial organisation pitching itself as the bastion of British defence science.
Split into two packages, arguably the second was a bone to keep the appearance of competition and result in many pounds spent by bidding teams for a foregone conclusion.
Red Dragon, the DARA aircraft repair facility at St. Athan in South Wales was a real beneficiary of the Wales Labour Party political caucus, who probably like Scotland have no love for the Conservative Government - which is now clearly being repaid in spades....
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The termination of the Defence Training Rationalisation (DTR) project and the Metrix Consortium's appointment as preferred bidder has been announced by Defence Secretary Dr Liam Fox today, 19 October 2010.
The DTR project intended to combine the technical and engineering training for the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force on a single site at St Athan in South Wales.
In a written ministerial statement to Parliament today, Dr Fox said:
"The Metrix Consortium was appointed as preferred bidder in January 2007 subject to it developing an affordable and value for money contract proposal.
"Given the significance of this project and the opportunity to provide a world-class training facility, the Ministry of Defence has worked tirelessly to deliver this project.
"However, it is now clear that Metrix cannot deliver an affordable, commercially-robust proposal within the prescribed period and it has therefore been necessary to terminate the DTR procurement and Metrix's appointment as preferred bidder.
"Technical training, collocated on as few sites as possible, remains in our view the best solution for our Armed Forces. Equally, St Athan was previously chosen as the best location on which to collocate that training for good reasons, and we still hope to base our future defence training solution there.
"We will however now carry out some work before finalising the best way ahead; including to confirm both our training and estates requirement, and the best way to structure the solution that will meet them.
"To ensure momentum is not lost, work on the alternative options will begin as soon as possible and we hope to be able to announce our future plans in the spring."
Training will continue to be delivered at current training locations as it would have done under the original PFI (Private Finance Initiative) proposal. These sites are: Arborfield, Blandford, Bordon, Cosford, Cranwell, Digby, Fareham (Collingwood), Gosport (Sultan) and St Athan.
Technorati Tags:
Defence Budget, UK Ministry of Defence
Monday, October 18, 2010
UK Releases NSS review document: A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy
UK Releases NSS review document: A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy
October 18th, 2010
Ahead of the release by the Prime Minister of the outcome of the SDSR Defence Review in the House of Commons at 1530hrs GMT (0930 EST) came the release of the foreign policy-led component known as The National Security Strategy (Command Paper Cm7953). A few comments jump off the page at first pass;
The foreword at the outset refers to Britain being both more secure and more vulnerable then ever before which seems to automatically question the logic of cutting resources to security needs. If national security assets are an insurance policy then Britain seems to be going down the "third party, fire & theft" route.
Page four sees The United States of America listed atop that of the international network of alliances, followed by the EU and NATO.
Page five refers to equipment acquisition rooted in the mindset of the Cold War.
KEY POINT: Page nine, a definition of the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, "to use all our national capabilities to build Britain's prosperity, extend our nation's influence in the world and strengthen our security. The networks we use to build our prosperity we will also use to build our security".
Page eleven identifies the top four threats in the next five years to UK security; terrorism (including CBRN (i.e. WMD) usage) and interesting flags Northern Ireland as a flashpoint, cyberattack, military crises and major accident or natural hazard.
Page thirteen identifies withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2015 - towards the end of the next US Presidency, and to the end of the first term of a Cameron Government, should the Government go the full five years before seeking re-election.
page fifteen (section 1.15) identifies the need to broaden out UK relationships beyond dependence on the USA and the world becomes more multi-polar.
page twenty-two (section 2.11) reaffirms the UK view of the Special Relationship - "Our strong defence relationship with the US... is exceptionally close and central to our national interest".
page twenty-seven - illustration of a 'risk register' of 15 major risks - which will be reviewed and updated biannually. The methodology (which is a two-by-two "impact:likelihood" matrix standard to any management consultant) is printed on page 37 for those unfamiliar.
October 18th, 2010
Ahead of the release by the Prime Minister of the outcome of the SDSR Defence Review in the House of Commons at 1530hrs GMT (0930 EST) came the release of the foreign policy-led component known as The National Security Strategy (Command Paper Cm7953). A few comments jump off the page at first pass;
The foreword at the outset refers to Britain being both more secure and more vulnerable then ever before which seems to automatically question the logic of cutting resources to security needs. If national security assets are an insurance policy then Britain seems to be going down the "third party, fire & theft" route.
Page four sees The United States of America listed atop that of the international network of alliances, followed by the EU and NATO.
Page five refers to equipment acquisition rooted in the mindset of the Cold War.
KEY POINT: Page nine, a definition of the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, "to use all our national capabilities to build Britain's prosperity, extend our nation's influence in the world and strengthen our security. The networks we use to build our prosperity we will also use to build our security".
Page eleven identifies the top four threats in the next five years to UK security; terrorism (including CBRN (i.e. WMD) usage) and interesting flags Northern Ireland as a flashpoint, cyberattack, military crises and major accident or natural hazard.
Page thirteen identifies withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2015 - towards the end of the next US Presidency, and to the end of the first term of a Cameron Government, should the Government go the full five years before seeking re-election.
page fifteen (section 1.15) identifies the need to broaden out UK relationships beyond dependence on the USA and the world becomes more multi-polar.
page twenty-two (section 2.11) reaffirms the UK view of the Special Relationship - "Our strong defence relationship with the US... is exceptionally close and central to our national interest".
page twenty-seven - illustration of a 'risk register' of 15 major risks - which will be reviewed and updated biannually. The methodology (which is a two-by-two "impact:likelihood" matrix standard to any management consultant) is printed on page 37 for those unfamiliar.
UK SDSR Defence Review outcomes - a matter of arithmetic ? Monday 18th October, 2010 There is much being trailed as to the release today by Prime Minister David Cameron as to the outcome of the review of resources devoted to the Ministry of Defence. Traditionally the Conservative Party are keen to be seen as strong and safe on defence and foreign policy. In an environment where substantial cuts are being made across government showing a grip on the issues, especially for a new administration is key. Which probably explains why the Departmental minister has been sidelined by No.10 which has taken strong control (through the Cabinet Office) of the defence review process. press sources are already trailing the following adjustments to UK force structure; * Retirement of the VSTOL Harrier (known as the AV-8B by the US) jump jet <a href="http://www.cityam.com/news-and-analysis/thousands-troops-go-defence-cuts">(CityAM)</a> * Retirement of HMS Ark Royal (Aircraft carrier and flagship of the Royal Navy) <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11570593">(BBC)</a> * Reductions to the strength of the British Army of the order of two brigades (7,000 troops) <a href="http://www.cityam.com/news-and-analysis/thousands-troops-go-defence-cuts">(CityAM)</a> The consensus which appears to have been trailed to the UK media and which seems uncontested by the Opposition is that cuts to the budget will amount to some 7-8% versus some 20% in other Government Departments (excluding health). Given that insiders acknowledge off-the-record that the MOD budget has been running some 10% beyond its resource level this would imply a 10.0 + 8.0% = 18.0% reduction. Hence the need for the PM to lead this announcement. What this means for UK 'Grand Strategy' remains to be seen as the National Security Strategy (NSS) seems to be headlining on the threat to UK global interests from cyber attack.
UK SDSR Defence Review outcomes - a matter of arithmetic ?
Monday 18th October, 2010
There is much being trailed as to the release today by Prime Minister David Cameron as to the outcome of the review of resources devoted to the Ministry of Defence. Traditionally the Conservative Party are keen to be seen as strong and safe on defence and foreign policy. In an environment where substantial cuts are being made across government showing a grip on the issues, especially for a new administration is key.
Which probably explains why the Departmental minister has been sidelined by No.10 which has taken strong control (through the Cabinet Office) of the defence review process. press sources are already trailing the following adjustments to UK force structure;
* Retirement of the VSTOL Harrier (known as the AV-8B by the US) jump jet (CityAM)
* Retirement of HMS Ark Royal (Aircraft carrier and flagship of the Royal Navy) (BBC)
* Reductions to the strength of the British Army of the order of two brigades (7,000 troops) (CityAM)
The consensus which appears to have been trailed to the UK media and which seems uncontested by the Opposition is that cuts to the budget will amount to some 7-8% versus some 20% in other Government Departments (excluding health).
Given that insiders acknowledge off-the-record that the MOD budget has been running some 10% beyond its resource level this would imply a 10.0 + 8.0% = 18.0% reduction.
Hence the need for the PM to lead this announcement. What this means for UK 'Grand Strategy' remains to be seen as the National Security Strategy (NSS) seems to be headlining on the threat to UK global interests from cyber attack.
Monday 18th October, 2010
There is much being trailed as to the release today by Prime Minister David Cameron as to the outcome of the review of resources devoted to the Ministry of Defence. Traditionally the Conservative Party are keen to be seen as strong and safe on defence and foreign policy. In an environment where substantial cuts are being made across government showing a grip on the issues, especially for a new administration is key.
Which probably explains why the Departmental minister has been sidelined by No.10 which has taken strong control (through the Cabinet Office) of the defence review process. press sources are already trailing the following adjustments to UK force structure;
* Retirement of the VSTOL Harrier (known as the AV-8B by the US) jump jet (CityAM)
* Retirement of HMS Ark Royal (Aircraft carrier and flagship of the Royal Navy) (BBC)
* Reductions to the strength of the British Army of the order of two brigades (7,000 troops) (CityAM)
The consensus which appears to have been trailed to the UK media and which seems uncontested by the Opposition is that cuts to the budget will amount to some 7-8% versus some 20% in other Government Departments (excluding health).
Given that insiders acknowledge off-the-record that the MOD budget has been running some 10% beyond its resource level this would imply a 10.0 + 8.0% = 18.0% reduction.
Hence the need for the PM to lead this announcement. What this means for UK 'Grand Strategy' remains to be seen as the National Security Strategy (NSS) seems to be headlining on the threat to UK global interests from cyber attack.
Tuesday, October 12, 2010
Editorial: Financial Times newspaper (October 12, 2010) - Lex: Defence M&A
With regard to the 'Defence M&A' item in the Lex column (FT October 12, 2010) one wonders if, for the government customer, that the pharmaceutical industry holds elements of a model applicable to defence.
The reliance of the major players on small incubator companies - taking risk and creating drugs needed in the real world - which when sufficiently refined are taken on board by the major pharma companies who have the advantages of production, distribution, customer relationships etc.
The likes of the UK MoD and DoD trying to evolve procurement methods such as 'spiral development', 'urgent operational requirements' etc. begs for a different approach.
Simply calling for break-up of a large clique is politically as likely as breaking up Goldman Sachs - like the atom bomb - consolidation in defence cannot be wound back.
Thursday, July 22, 2010
The United Kingdom's SDSR Defence Review - identifying real options for change
The United Kingdom's SDSR Defence Review - identifying real options for change
July 22, 2010
The Strategic Defence and Security Review (or SDSR) currently underway within the UK Ministry of Defence has as its aim a full review of UK commitments, force structures and resourcing.
What started as a Defence green paper under the previous Labour Administration has entered full-blown review territory and following the extent of the UK deficit being revealed is being conducted to achieve all of the above with a substantial reduction in funding.
Given the Sir Humphrey response to political requests for cuts in departmental spending, "come up with three options of which one is completely unpalatable and the other two on close examination are the same". One would expect the reduction in resources to be of the 10-15% level rather than the 20-25% level mooted.
However, it is often been unofficially acknowledged that MoD was able to use it's accounting regime in such as way as to squeeze an extra billion out of budget, so any real cuts also need to encompass the lack of manoeuvre room for budgetary games.
The SDSR or SDR as some are referring to it in shorthand is in effect a 'Strategic Deficit Review' as much as a Strategic Defence Review. In addition the MoD case is due to be sent to Cabinet Office (assuming the successor DOPC structure) and thence to the Star Chamber for execution by the PM and Chancellor.
Unlike many earlier Reviews, it could be suggested that this one cannot result in a salami-slicing approach where in effect each of three armed services is given a number and their cloth is cut accordingly - a couple of tanks here, a frigate there and so forth. One apocryphal example of this was in 1990 where a group were directed to save a few hundred million and had a couple of hours to do to support the Minister. The exercise ended up with harassed officials looking for a Program closest to the number, in this case night vision. Following the war in the Gulf of 1991, the shortfall identified was in - night vision,
The SDSR review process needs to move away from optimising the British Army to re-fight the 1991 or 2003 Iraq war, the Navy the Falklands war of 1982 and the RAF the glories of Operation Desert Fox.
The future will not be like the past.
However, a little lateral thinking could go a long way. The hardest thing to cut in terms of actually doing it and realizing a fast return on the balance sheet are personnel numbers. This is the reason the equipment Program (invariably requiring government to spend on outside goods and services)
The number one challenge for the MoD is the nuclear deterrent. Renewal of the four Vanguard Class SSBN's plus the Trident warheads comes with a price tag in the order of some £20 billion ($30 US). However a clear alternative to designing a new submarine would be to build additional Astute Class hunter/killer submarines and forgo Trident for a nuclear tipped Tomahawk torpedo. Whilst lacking the range and having some vulnerability to intercept let's not forget that this is a political weapon primarily and if used and if only 1 in 4 hit the target it would still be a very high order of 'effect'.
Additionally, a force of Astute SSN/BN submarines would offer flexibility 100% availability as at least one would always be at sea.
For industry, a lengthened Astute Program would offer greater efficiencies (each successive boat being cheaper to build) and greater ease of maintenance with a single design being in service.
The second order question regarding large, expensive equipment programs already committed to is how to get the results of the balance sheet without risking contract termination - which would be devastating to the Defence industry.
Eurofighter could be re-rolled for service on the new aircraft carriers under construction absorbing some of the tranche 3 commitment and again offering basic commonality of airframe for manned aerial effect.
Part of the tranche 3 commitment could be sold on to another government with Saudi Arabia topping the list of obvious parties whom would be interested. Clearly this approach would end UK interest in JSF which is in the test stage, though prior to production.
Next on the list is some clever thinking regarding the carriers themselves. A few years ago there was discussion of the French ordering one of the designs as a second ship to work alongside the unhappy nuclear Charles de Gaulle vessel in some kind of 'euro carrier capability'
Why not sell the first of class overseas ? First of class vessels often are a learning curve and so why not get the first vessel off the balance sheet and enjoy better quality 2nd and 3rd vessels and realize some cost savings. In terms of whom would purchase, the Russian aircraft carrier was touted to the Indian and Chinese Navies. At the time of the Falklands conflict HMS Hermes was due to be sold to India and ultimately was as the Vikrant. that vessel must be close to the end of it's operational life for example.
The Royal Air Force I would suspect could be hard pressed to articulate why the Tornado GR4 is still needed in a period of austerity given that a number of the aircraft have been flown to the edge of their lifespan. A navalised Eurofighter also negates sadly the Harrier jump-jet. If only JSF was not bedeviled by the ITAR waiver issues with the US and inevitable cost-escalation. In terms of supply chain and excluding Eurofighter why does the RAF need so many stations ? Time for fast consolidation.
The Royal Navy also needs to forgo a Naval Base with Portsmouth the obvious choice. Although a deal of service accommodation was built there recently the fact is that Portsmouth real estate is far more valuable and there is a fundamental force protection issue given how busy the waterways are around the Solent.
In terms of the surface fleet the most pressing need is to move forward with a replacement Program for the Type-23 Frigate which is modular, small, punchy and plentiful in numbers. Hopefully the river class vessels can offer a better model than a cut down type 42 for the 'c1' capability need.
Major new investment in UAV's should be the winner. A smaller frigate should have dedicated UAV ASW capability reducing the need for Nimrod from the RAF.
Whilst sad, thinking the unthinkable as Herman Kahn once put it is no longer a luxury which can be pursued in the Club room or mess. It is essential and is needed right now.
- Posted using BlogPress from my iPhone
July 22, 2010
The Strategic Defence and Security Review (or SDSR) currently underway within the UK Ministry of Defence has as its aim a full review of UK commitments, force structures and resourcing.
What started as a Defence green paper under the previous Labour Administration has entered full-blown review territory and following the extent of the UK deficit being revealed is being conducted to achieve all of the above with a substantial reduction in funding.
Given the Sir Humphrey response to political requests for cuts in departmental spending, "come up with three options of which one is completely unpalatable and the other two on close examination are the same". One would expect the reduction in resources to be of the 10-15% level rather than the 20-25% level mooted.
However, it is often been unofficially acknowledged that MoD was able to use it's accounting regime in such as way as to squeeze an extra billion out of budget, so any real cuts also need to encompass the lack of manoeuvre room for budgetary games.
The SDSR or SDR as some are referring to it in shorthand is in effect a 'Strategic Deficit Review' as much as a Strategic Defence Review. In addition the MoD case is due to be sent to Cabinet Office (assuming the successor DOPC structure) and thence to the Star Chamber for execution by the PM and Chancellor.
Unlike many earlier Reviews, it could be suggested that this one cannot result in a salami-slicing approach where in effect each of three armed services is given a number and their cloth is cut accordingly - a couple of tanks here, a frigate there and so forth. One apocryphal example of this was in 1990 where a group were directed to save a few hundred million and had a couple of hours to do to support the Minister. The exercise ended up with harassed officials looking for a Program closest to the number, in this case night vision. Following the war in the Gulf of 1991, the shortfall identified was in - night vision,
The SDSR review process needs to move away from optimising the British Army to re-fight the 1991 or 2003 Iraq war, the Navy the Falklands war of 1982 and the RAF the glories of Operation Desert Fox.
The future will not be like the past.
However, a little lateral thinking could go a long way. The hardest thing to cut in terms of actually doing it and realizing a fast return on the balance sheet are personnel numbers. This is the reason the equipment Program (invariably requiring government to spend on outside goods and services)
The number one challenge for the MoD is the nuclear deterrent. Renewal of the four Vanguard Class SSBN's plus the Trident warheads comes with a price tag in the order of some £20 billion ($30 US). However a clear alternative to designing a new submarine would be to build additional Astute Class hunter/killer submarines and forgo Trident for a nuclear tipped Tomahawk torpedo. Whilst lacking the range and having some vulnerability to intercept let's not forget that this is a political weapon primarily and if used and if only 1 in 4 hit the target it would still be a very high order of 'effect'.
Additionally, a force of Astute SSN/BN submarines would offer flexibility 100% availability as at least one would always be at sea.
For industry, a lengthened Astute Program would offer greater efficiencies (each successive boat being cheaper to build) and greater ease of maintenance with a single design being in service.
The second order question regarding large, expensive equipment programs already committed to is how to get the results of the balance sheet without risking contract termination - which would be devastating to the Defence industry.
Eurofighter could be re-rolled for service on the new aircraft carriers under construction absorbing some of the tranche 3 commitment and again offering basic commonality of airframe for manned aerial effect.
Part of the tranche 3 commitment could be sold on to another government with Saudi Arabia topping the list of obvious parties whom would be interested. Clearly this approach would end UK interest in JSF which is in the test stage, though prior to production.
Next on the list is some clever thinking regarding the carriers themselves. A few years ago there was discussion of the French ordering one of the designs as a second ship to work alongside the unhappy nuclear Charles de Gaulle vessel in some kind of 'euro carrier capability'
Why not sell the first of class overseas ? First of class vessels often are a learning curve and so why not get the first vessel off the balance sheet and enjoy better quality 2nd and 3rd vessels and realize some cost savings. In terms of whom would purchase, the Russian aircraft carrier was touted to the Indian and Chinese Navies. At the time of the Falklands conflict HMS Hermes was due to be sold to India and ultimately was as the Vikrant. that vessel must be close to the end of it's operational life for example.
The Royal Air Force I would suspect could be hard pressed to articulate why the Tornado GR4 is still needed in a period of austerity given that a number of the aircraft have been flown to the edge of their lifespan. A navalised Eurofighter also negates sadly the Harrier jump-jet. If only JSF was not bedeviled by the ITAR waiver issues with the US and inevitable cost-escalation. In terms of supply chain and excluding Eurofighter why does the RAF need so many stations ? Time for fast consolidation.
The Royal Navy also needs to forgo a Naval Base with Portsmouth the obvious choice. Although a deal of service accommodation was built there recently the fact is that Portsmouth real estate is far more valuable and there is a fundamental force protection issue given how busy the waterways are around the Solent.
In terms of the surface fleet the most pressing need is to move forward with a replacement Program for the Type-23 Frigate which is modular, small, punchy and plentiful in numbers. Hopefully the river class vessels can offer a better model than a cut down type 42 for the 'c1' capability need.
Major new investment in UAV's should be the winner. A smaller frigate should have dedicated UAV ASW capability reducing the need for Nimrod from the RAF.
Whilst sad, thinking the unthinkable as Herman Kahn once put it is no longer a luxury which can be pursued in the Club room or mess. It is essential and is needed right now.
- Posted using BlogPress from my iPhone
Location:In a galaxy far, far, away...
Technorati Tags:
Editorial, UK Ministry of Defence, SDSR Review
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)